Egypt Votes and what I expect

Egyptians are heading to the polls today for the first day of voting in what will probably be the freest and fairest elections in the country’s history. What comes of the elections remains to be seen, but there’s no doubt this is no small feat.

The importance of the vote is the underlined by the fact that only a year ago today, the Egyptian government oversaw an incredibly fraudulent election. Hosni Mubarak’s National Democratic Party and its associated independents used bribery, violence, and intimidation to secure over 90 percent of the vote.

The elections were already delayed once, and they were at risk of being delayed again last week after protestors and riot police in Cairo clashed non-stop for nearly a week. After a massive protest November 19th, riot police violently dispersed a sit-in of roughly 200 people the next day, most of which were families of demonstrators who were injured in January by the same riot police. Police responded with large amounts of tear gas, birdshot, and live ammunition. The scene was lachrymose in every sense of the word.

The violence prompted throngs of Egyptians to flood the square. Those that that didn’t “go down,” as Egyptians say, were split on whether to go or not, worrying that they could delay elections and slow the transition. The military announced that elections would ago ahead as scheduled, a decision supported by the Muslim Brotherhood who is slated to win big if polls are held earlier rather than later.

In light of the clashes, many activists called for a boycott of the elections. The argument was that Egyptians couldn’t vote only a few miles from where their fellow citizens had been killed only a few days before. Others worried that the system wasn’t sufficiently free of influence from the powers-that-be, arguing (not incorrectly) that these elections aren’t going to be as free and as fair as they should be.

But, it appears as though their calls fell on deaf ears. Most journalists this morning are reporting long lines full of enthusiastic voters, and political parties (sometimes illegally) attempting to help them vote. Expect to see lots of inked-dyed fingers over today and tomorrow in the news.

Although I understand activist arguments for a boycott, I’m hopeful, and maybe even optimistic, this vote is going to be the beginning of a new period in Egyptian politics. If nothing huge goes wrong, the new period will be characterized by bolstered civil and political pluralism and a rivalry between the civilian government and the military.

The latter will be interesting to watch, and will likely be a slow and drawn out process. I foresee this happening even if arguably ‘illiberal’ political movements—namely Salafists and to a certain degree the Muslim Brotherhood—dominate the parliament. Regardless of character, most parties will still trace their support to a civilian, not military, constituency. That means that Islamist parties’ modus vivendi with the military will be over very soon.

We already saw the battle lines over the character of the new Egyptian state drawn on the Nov. 19 protest I mentioned before. Salafists and the Brotherhood were not about to have the powers of their civilian-led government undercut by the military on the eve of their accession to power. My feeling is that they were more upset about military privilege than articles that gave the Egyptian state a non-religious character.

My predictions depend on a nearly infinite number of assumptions, many of them visceral, that I’ve accumulated over my time here, not least of which is that pro-military parties don’t take too much power. In any case, we won’t know what to expect until the elections, which are going to be a nearly four month odyssey, in which anything can happen. The uncertainty continues.

On Maspiro, and sectarianism

A week ago tonight, at least 26 Egyptians died after the military very violently broke up a protest in downtown Cairo. Egyptian Christians, joined by Muslims, were protesting their marginalization in Egyptian society. In particular, they were protesting inaction by the military junta after an Arson attack in the southern Egyptian province of Aswan burned down a church.

State media falsely reported that the Christians “snatched” weapons from the soldiers and fired on them. That claim ended up being carried by the Associated Press, making its way to many western papers and websites. ‘Snatched’ is a word that I had never heard in a serious context, although I could maintain that assertion since official news switched their story later to say foreign elements incited the violence. State media basically informed Egyptians that Christians were attacking the army, and honorable citizens should go ‘defend’ the military. When a friend of mine who was at the protests asked people who came why they came, they said they saw it on TV. Even more troubling is that police officers reportedly told people Egyptians in coffee shops that the Quran was being burned by Christians at the protest, bringing even more people to the defense of the Army, thinking they were defending Islam. By the time things calmed down, at least 26 Egyptians were dead and hundreds injured, some shot, but many crushed by armored personnel carriers (APCs) driving erratically through the crowds.

The most troubling civil violence comes not when organized institutions of power (i.e. the army) that are coordinated from the top-down, but when individuals latch onto a certain narrative and engage in violence themselves. Once civil violence penetrates down to an individual rather than on an organizational level, it is bad, bad news. That is what happened last Sunday. Videos from the clashes have been surfacing, showing civilians with bars, clubs, chains, etc. beating protestors.

The tragic irony is that official media’s narrative of what was going on–that the violence was sectarian in nature–essentially was spoken into existence. There is no doubt sectarianism is alive and well in egypt, but positing the clashes in sectarian terms by saying that Christians were attacking the army brought regular Egyptians to the clashes to fight for their ‘sect.’ It distracted viewers and listeners from what was originally going on: that the army was violently suppressing a protest that directly challenged the military junta’s inability or its unwillingness to protect the Christian minority. When the army draws its legitimacy as a defender of all Egyptians regardless of color or creed, framing your protest in a way that suggests otherwise is a direct challenge to those in power. For the ruling military council, resetting the narrative to sectarianism is a convenient way to delegitimize the protestors and increase your relevancy as a security provider.

Convincing Egyptians that the clashes were a case of rulers suppressing the ruled, rather than Christians venting sectarian anger on the Egyptian military, is going to be an uphill battle. Although Egyptian media is much freer than it was this time last year, independent media is still either drowned out by a much larger state media apparatus, beholden to commercial considerations (speaking the ‘truth,’ as conceived by the news consumer), or simply censored/self-censored. But, considerable efforts are being made to counter the official account. The military council’s multimedia press conference was countered by an alternative one that gave protestors’ account of what happened, and websites have popped up full of testimonies of how a the interaction between the military and protestors turned violent. These are all local initiatives meant for Egyptians, not foreigners. On a related note, considerable foreign media coverage has already latched onto the sectarian narrative,* probably because sectarian violence is an intriguing topic that their readers like to read about, rather than place sectarian violence in a wider context. I can’t emphasize how important it is to find journalists (not outlets) that you trust when following the news.

What happened last week highlights how far Egypt will have to go in order to transition to a functional open society. It is hard to imagine a democratic Egypt that does not have independent voices to challenge the narrative placed in citizen’s minds, regardless if that message is broadcasted by a Mubarak regime, a military regime, or even a democratically elected one.

 

 

*There are other examples of this, but this is a good example of ignoring wider considerations before prioritizing the sectarian dynamic.

No electoral law, but some Katy Perry

I’ve been working on a pretty technical post about Egypt’s ‘new’ electoral districts. I’m hoping to give everyone a tiny bit of insight into how the elections could play out and how the military council decided to split up competition. Unfortunately, just as I’m close to finishing military council decided to change the law. Not completely unpredictable, but still a little frustrating. Some of the ground work has been laid though, so I’ll hopefully be able quickly process the new law once it comes out.

So you don’t leave empty-handed, here are some of the better things I’ve been reading. A lot of these are outside of what I usually focus on (or really outdated) but I’m sure you’ll enjoy them if you haven’t already.

New:

Katy Perry’s HOT ‘N COLD ft. President Ali Abdullah Saleh: Katy Perry was actually singing about Ali Abdullah Saleh’s propensity to change his mind.

Syria: The revolution will be weaponised – al-Jazeera EnglishFirst of a seven part series that is a must read. Nir Rosen was in Syria for seven weeks and spoke to activists, Islamists, normal Syrians of every color and creed, army defectors, aka everybody.

Secrets of a Super-fixer in Libya – ReutersFormer SAS BA in Libya

The Surreal Ruins of Qaddafi’s Never-Never Land – The New York Times MagazineThis title is pretty much what it seems, although mentioning Never Land in the same breath as Gadhafi’s curly hair and eccentricity is sure to bring thoughts of Michael Jackson.

Shovel-Ready Shibboleths- The Wall Street Journal: Friedman getting crapped on is my favorite.

Hot Teachers – Foreign Policy’s Middle East ChannelThe recent teachers’ strike seems to be part of a bigger trend of interest groups in Egypt fighting for more parochial interests.

Ziad Baroud: The Minister That Never Was: al-Akhbar English: Profile of Lebanon’s promising politician that never delivered on structural reform. Sounds familiar.

The Return of the NDP – Ahram Online: Mubarak’s party quietly returns to politics.

Old:

What Do Egypt’s Writers Do Now? – New York TimesApparently Egyptian authors’ muses were chased out with Mubarak.

The Arab Counterrevolution – The New York Review of BooksDepressing look at the revolutions, although to be expected.

Blowback in Somalia – The Nation: Crash course in Somalia, if one exists.

Getting Bin Laden – The New Yorker: How the assassination went down.

Sorry, I was in post-rapture Dubai

My apologizes for the long hiatus. The last couple weeks have been pretty busy, both for me and in my neck of the woods. I recently just left a (very) brief stint as a business reporter for an English-Language news website here called Bikyamasr. The work depleted my staring-at-the-computer quota most days, so I unfortunately neglected my duty to post here. If–for some reason–you’re interested in telecom industry in North Africa, you kind find what I wrote here. I’m now a copy editor at the English Edition of al-Youm as-Sabea (اليوم السابع), or “The Seventh Day.” English edition here, Arabic here.

I’ll also use my recent trip to Dubai as an excuse for not writing. On my trip I decided that Dubai has quasi post-apocalyptic feel to it due to what appears to be a perfect storm.

For one, it was the worst weather I’ve ever experienced. 98º F at night, unbelievable humidity, and dust from the desert clogging up the air. On more than one occasion I woke up to find that the industrial strength AC had caused the air to condense on the entirety of the windows. I also was able to visit the interior desert, and now can say that I experienced what 50º C (122º F) feels like (not pleasant).

In the middle of this, a building boom has caused dozens of ridiculously new buildings to sprout up. A friend of my dad’s described Dubai as an architects dream. Real estate was such a bull market, so Architects could pitch their design to one of the hundreds of developers looking to cash in. The result is striking. I have never seen so many sumptuous designs in my life in the same place. But, the thing is, most of them are empty since the financial crisis–including the the world’s tallest building, the Burj Khalifa. The Burj Khalifa was originally called the Burj Dubai before it underwent a close to last-minute name change that cost more than a million dollars. The name change served as a reminder to Dubai that after bailing it out, Abu Dhabi is (still) the top dog amongst the seven emirates.

Click for Detail

You also expect more human and automobile traffic in such a scene, but there simply isn’t. The combination of heat, real estate oversupply, and financial crisis have created a city that seems to be running at 10% of capacity. At first I thought it was like a zombie movie, but I think Dubai is more reminiscent of the rapture, making Dubai more Left Behind than 28 Days Later–the rapture being the Financial Crisis.

The rapture/financial crisis left much of Dubai’s population to deal with the depressed economy and to feed and water the smaller number of tourists who still come there. One worker I met was from Peshawar, Pakistan, who came to Dubai in 2006, waited 6 months for work, then was laid off in the midst of the meltdown before he could find work again cleaning malls, then as a cab driver. He saves money by sharing a two room apartment with 11 other workers like him, and sends most money of his back home to Pakistan.

It will be interesting to see if Dubai, and the other Emirates for that matter, are able to fight off all the forces hell-bent on ruining the Emirati Princes’ project and pet projects. For now they heat, financial woes, a lack of indigenous culture (which it seems to have traded for facile capitalism), and the desert are all working against them. Their only weapon seems to be their petro-dollars, which are quickly running out and seem to have already won round one.

Link Dump

Egypt:

Lebanon:

Elsewhere:

  • The whole debt debacle seems inane from this side of the world. Thanks Brits: “There is no good economic reason why this should be happening.”
  • On Grammar and the NYT’s coverage of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict
  • US Diplomats think donuts will help Bahraini protestors (Are shiites the anti-donuts or sunnis?)
  • Sarah Carr on Friedman from awhile back, an oldie but a goodie.

Tomorrow’s Protest or: Why did the Muslim Brotherhood decide to come out?

There is a big protest planned for Friday in Tahrir Square. When I was writing this post before, I simply referred to it as a “protest” but the fact that the Muslim Brotherhood is participating is going to make it “big.” The Brotherhood issued a statement Wednesday saying they were going to come out (English here, Arabic here). The Arabic statement is odd, because it beings by listing all the reasons why the Brotherhood was going to stay home. Translation below:

“…the Muslim Brotherhood decided last Saturday to not participate in this activity for several reasons; the most important of them being the intention of the constitution first، which requires circumventing the will of the people that manifested in last March’s referendum, as well as postponing parliamentary elections, lengthening the transitional period and the extension of the Military council’s administration, and continuing the economic slowdown and stopping investment…”

As you can see, there are many reasons why the Brothers–colloquially referred to as the Ikhwan–would boycott today’s protests. But unlisted is the apparent modus vivendi between the Brothers and the SCAF. The relationship is essentially one of harmony of interests, at least in the short term. By not bolstering protests, the Brotherhood stands to gain from a short transitional period where they are the most organized in comparison to other political groups in Egypt. The military stands to gain because they can relinquish their power to a civilian state sooner, and consquently resume the backseat driving that allows them to deflect criticism, while protecting their interests in Egypt.

But there are a few great reasons by the Brothers are coming out to protest. In keeping with my habit with listing things, I’ve cataloged them as follows:

  1. Dissatisfaction with the electoral law: The Brotherhood was one of the few parties that protested the electoral law, which is a mix between party lists and a system that allows individual candidates to run. The Brotherhood was likely in favor of a system that allows them to control the list of candidates that are available to voters, much do to their new political coalition with secular parties. The independent list provision allows other candidates to question this to-be orchestrated political order, especially those who have left the Ikhwan over disagreements on how to move forward, bringing us to point number two:
  2. Stemming youth defections: The Brotherhood has been struggling to keep its younger members in light of recent defections. Younger members have little incentive to adhere to polices they disagree with now that they no longer need the parent organization’s behavior. The party has already split into no less than five smaller parties, and the Brothers have expelled some of its former all-stars like Issam Lofty. The Brotherhood’s youth wing was instrumental in some of the management of the revolution: manning security checkpoints, running emergency clinics for those injured, as well as feeding and watering the thousands that turned out to Tahrir this past winter. Keeping these members in the Brotherhood is important to make sure that they stay a sizable and disciplined bloc in the new order, rather than a loose coalition of several smaller parties, in order to…
  3. Bolster their broker status: Nobody knows how much the Brotherhood would be able to gain during the upcoming election. Given the fragmented status of the new order its doubtful that they will be able to win an outright majority.  By being the key vote to guarantee the success or failure of a protest, the Brotherhood is compounding its sway. Already two liberal-secular presidential candidates have asked the Brotherhood for its support.
  4. Keeping leverage on the SCAF: This is also going to be an important reminder to the SCAF of the importance of their modus vivendi with the Brothers, which I discussed above. If they don’t play ball, the Brothers can make serious trouble for them by reinforcing the protest movement that has some of the SCAF’s key interests in their crosshairs. Two of these are the guise of political stability via a lack of protests, and the Military’s preferential treatment by the Egyptian state. The SCAF probably also had a role in the Electoral law, which a la point number one, dissatisfied the Brotherhood.

Each of these interests are very much interelated, and have to do with the Brotherhood attempting to place themselves in somewhere between the SCAF and the protest movement for now, and between the new political parties of the emergent political landscape later on. Its important to remember that the Ikhwan are really a social movement interested in Islamizing society first and political group second. My reading is that they are more interested in two things: (1) having a political position that gives them legal protections and a platform to preach from; and (2) a swing-vote in case the other parties in parliament decide to curtail its efforts to make the society a more pious one.

This strategy is really contingent on maintaining party discipline, so defusing the generational tensions inside the Brotherhood are key to maintaing a sizable bloc. It seems that these younger members are more political than the leadership of the Brotherhood and are more interested in actually shaping the Egyptian state directly rather than through its society. Party discipline will be especially important when the constitution is being written, and the official Brotherhood party (Freedom and Justice) can’t guarantee that the new smaller parties will vote with its more conservative and reactionary predecessor party.

In any case tomorrow will be a very important day in Egypt, for better or worse. Stay tuned.

 

Where is Egypt? or: What will I be writing on the next couple of weeks?

There are a few things that Egypt will have to take care of in the coming months, which makes sense considering it’s a post-revolutionary state and all. Ideally I’ll cover each of these admittedly broad topics more in depth later, but until then I thought I’d give you a little brief on each of them so you can place any reading you’re doing in more context.

The Economy: Its not too controversial to say that instability breeds uncertainty, and uncertainty breeds economic stagnation. I hope you took the time to read the Economist’s article on the Egyptian economy in my previous post.  Economic grievances were a lot of what caused the revolution in the first place. But, a lot of Egyptians just want the protestors to go home and stop scaring away tourists or investors (depending on which kind of Egyptian you are) so things can get back to normal.

From what I’ve gleaned, local demands for certain economic polices conflict with the enticing loans international actors being offered from the World Bank and IMF, which the Egyptian Ministry of Finance can’t decide to take or to decline. Throw in gratitously-sized assistance and “gifts” from the Gulf States and Saudi Arabia, and you have a lot of different forces complicating and obscuring the economic future of post-Revolution Egypt.

The Constitution: This is one of those topics that riles up political science nerds like myself. Despite amendments that were passed in March (text here, analysis here), all lines of power still lead to the presidency, whose website never ceases to amuse. Obviously, Egypt has been without a president since Mubarak left in February, but his institutional powers are under the control of the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (aka SCAF, proununced skaf). This will change after a new constitution is drafted, although to what extent is up to the drafters.

I can’t really overstate the importance of this, because it will set the rules of the game for some time to come. Some are pushing for the constitution to be written after the elections, and others before. This really translates into who will write the constitution. The conventional narrative right now is that if the constitution is written after, better organized groups will rewrite the rules of the game to favor them. These better organized groups are understood to be Islamists and opposition parties that existed before the revolution. How representatives will be chosen is still pretty vague, except that a 100-member council will be decided upon by the new parliament.

The Elections: While the constitutions will set the rules of the game in the future, electoral law will set the rules of the game for upcoming parliamentary vote this fall. The government just recently settled on a mixed electoral system, the details of which I will translate from polisci jargon into english/amerrican in a later post. Already some political groups are protesting the current electoral law.

The Police and Brutality: The before/after constitutional debate proved to be a little too divisive for some protest organizers, so the upcoming protest this Friday focuses on abuses of the Mubarak era and the police–the Muslim Brotherhood only joined today because the constitution demand was dropped. This also seems to be a move to seize on the relevancy of these issues in light of the clashes this past week, and the postponement of trials of police and former regime figures. Jason Brownlee, who is an awesome if not one of the best commentators on Egypt, touched on the importance of civilianizing control security forces to the revolution on Jadaliyya just yesterday.

Hopefully this primer will allow you to read Egypt related news in context. Be back here soon.

Arrived in Cairo

The Nile from Qasr al-Nil Bridge

I was welcomed here in Cairo last Thursday to my friends and their great hospitality. I expect to be focusing more on finding a job and a place to live than doing some writing here for the next week or so. But I will be dumping links occasionally for those of you looking for updates on Lebanon and Egypt.

Lebanon:

Egypt:

Elsewhere:

See you back on the blog soon!